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 1 
Abstract  
 
 State institutions that came into being centuries ago have taken on different roles in the 
post-World War II period of globalization. These institutions may have changed significantly as 
their roles have become greater to accommodate participation in the global political economy. 
The theory I develop in this paper indicates that the legal origins of a state continue to have a 
relationship with its current level of economic globalization. This theory is based on previous 
research produced by several other scholars. My research focuses on the English common law 
origin and I hypothesize that countries with this legal origin are more likely to experience higher 
levels of economic globalization than countries with alternative legal origins. The evidence I 
introduce supports this hypothesis.   
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Section I. Introduction 
 Geographical proximity, cultural similarities, and shared values are often reasons why 
people believe that countries have similar institutions and behaviors to one another. While these 
reasons may be true, there may be other underlying factors that connect the foundations of states. 
The relationship between states is continuously evaluated and re-evaluated through the various 
theories of international relations scholars. Many of these theories attempt to explain the shifting 
power relations among states and how individual states impact the world in a broader sense. 
Some scholars, however, argue that there are some ways in which the fundamental structures of 
states have remained constant influential forces in the way states behave. One of these structures 
that has stimulated a large amount of research is legal origin. If so many differences between 
states drive them apart, then the idea of a structural similarity in their legal origin binding them 
together and influencing their decisions today is truly remarkable. The question many 
researchers have attempted to answer is: does legal origin still influence the actions of and 
remain relevant to states today?  
The concept of legal origin has produced theoretical research and controversy from 
economists and political scientists. A majority of this research has focused on the influence of 
legal origin at the national level, especially on institutions. Some research has taken this a step 
further by identifying possible relationships between legal origin and financial development. The 
trend of research on legal origin theory involves highly speculative causation of relationships.  
My approach will differ from predecessors by attempting to apply legal origin theory to the 
broader concept of economic globalization. There are many factors that contribute to the 
economic globalization index, and not all of them will be possible to cover in this paper. Because 
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of its ambitious nature, my research will not be as specific as previous works, but it may open up 
the theory to more general speculation from wider audiences.  
 To outline the rest of the paper, section II will provide examples of previous literature on 
legal origin theory to provide historical background on the subject and review how other scholars 
have approached it. Section III will unpack my theory on how legal origin will relate to the 
broader concept of globalization and present my hypothesis for the research results. Section IV 
will include my research specific research design, and section V will present my data and 
analysis. Finally, section VI will be my final thoughts and conclusion of the paper.  
 
Section II. Background on Legal Origin  
 The majority of recent literature on legal origin tends to be focused on the significance of 
English common law and French commercial law in terms of financial markets. I start with the 
literature focused on the general importance of legal origin and the derived social and economic 
effects (Glaeser and Shleifer 2002). I then investigate literature that covers legal traditions and 
the influence of legal origins on current institutional structures in terms of common law and civil 
law (La Porta et al., 2008). Some literature refers to French commercial law as French civil law, 
but I will be using the two terms interchangeably.  I then cover literature by Beck et al. (2002), 
which is primarily focused on the relationship between legal origin and financial markets. A 
chapter written by Francis Snyder (2004) explains how the introduction and rise of international 
actors influenced domestic legal institutions. Finally, I include a paper by Camilla Capucio 
(2015) to provide further analysis of the role of domestic institutions in the global political 
economy.  
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1. History of Legal Origin 
  One of the common trends among previous literature on legal origin is to emphasize the 
differences between English common law and French civil law. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) look 
specifically at the histories and operations of the two legal systems in order to explain their 
differing economic outcomes. I will return to the theory of their study later to reexamine the 
economic outcomes of legal origin from a global perspective. The study first examines how the 
two countries diverged in their methods to control corruption and coercion within their 
respective judicial systems. France chose “adjudication by royally controlled professional judges, 
while England moved toward adjudication by relatively independent juries” (1194). Glaeser and 
Shleifer attribute the differences in social and economic outcomes between the two countries and 
their former colonies to the original structural differences and subsequent modifications within 
their legal systems.  
 Understanding the structural history of both common law and commercial law is 
necessary to the conclusions which I will draw from my data later in this paper. However, the 
section of Glaeser and Shleifer’s work more directly related to my research question is their 
conclusions on social outcomes. The introduction of the paper describes that legal structures 
develop as a response to the levels of law and order within a country. The research they draw 
from La Porta et al. 1999, finds that “French civil law countries have less secure property rights, 
greater government regulation and intervention, greater government ownership of banks and 
industry, and higher levels of corruption and red tape than do common law countries. There is 
also evidence that, at the same level of development, common law countries are more financially 
developed than their civil law counterparts” (Glaeser and Schneider 2002, 1194). This 
information appears to be significant to a broader social context but is not explored much further 
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in the paper. The authors instead turn their attention towards the inefficiencies of law systems in 
former colonies to which they have been transplanted.  
 This research provides critical information regarding the differences between two of the 
most widespread legal origin systems. My research will attempt to apply the relevance of English 
common law to the world today, but Glaeser and Shleifer’s research allows us to understand how 
these systems came to be. Before applying legal origins to a broader subject, such as 
globalization, establishing their key structural differences will allow me to theorize why some 
are more successful than others, centuries after their establishment. The social outcomes section 
of the research fails to explore law systems in a more modern and generalized sense that readers 
can apply to a current event. The authors focus their attention on the inadequacies of legal 
systems which have been transplanted in another country, specifically their vulnerabilities to 
abuse by a sovereign and ability to enforce property protection laws. While they are very 
important to legal systems, these points do not give a sense of broader social outcomes today.  
 
2. Applications of Legal Origin 
 Work published later by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) further explains 
how legal origins influence economic outcomes despite their divergences, convergences, and 
development over time. This paper also emphasizes the consequences of involuntary 
transplantation of legal systems but introduces some new consequences which will be beneficial 
in my theory later on. First, this research eliminates some of the legal systems which may not be 
worth exploring. To start, the countries which were once classified as having socialist law origins 
have reverted to their pre-WWII systems since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The authors state that 
several countries do, in fact, still have this legal system, but a lack of data prevents them from 
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being included in their study. Additionally, “because Scandinavian countries did not have any 
colonies, and Germany’s colonial influence was short-lived and abruptly erased by World War I, 
there are relatively few countries in these two traditions” (290). This means that their legal 
systems were either not transplanted to other countries, or they were brought to other countries 
but mostly do not exist there anymore. This information provides reasoning to use English 
common law and French civil law as the two most significant legal systems in a study regarding 
the relationship between legal origin and another variable.  
 Another section of this paper describes the mechanisms through which legal origin 
influences economic outcomes. La Porta, et al. compile research from previous papers to create a 
figure showing institutions that are constructed from legal origin, and these institutions produce 
varying economic outcomes. They do so by dividing the previous studies into three categories. 
The first group “examines the effects of legal origins on investor protection and then the effect of 
investor protection on financial development” (292). The second group “consider government 
regulation, or even ownership, of particular economic activities.” The final group “investigates 
the effects of legal origins on the characteristics of the judiciary, and then the effects of those on 
the security of property rights and contract enforcement.” The data in the paper finds that 
common law is overall more associated with better investment protection and financial 
development than French civil law. Countries with common law also have less government 
regulation of markets and more independent judicial systems, creating “more secure property 
rights and better contract enforcement.”  
The authors also introduce a new concept referred to as Legal Origins Theory. There are 
three key components that they highlight within the theory. The first is that England and France 
developed different styles of social control of business and built varying institutions that allowed 
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them to do so. The second key component is that these institutions and preferred styles of control 
were transplanted to countries throughout the world during the periods of colonialism and 
imperialism. And their last key element in Legal Origins Theory is that the original styles of 
social control developed in France and England by the nineteenth century have persisted through 
regulatory changes and continue to be the foundation for addressing social problems (La Porta et 
al., 2008) 
The research conducted by La Porta et al. (2008) is instrumental in identifying some of 
the mechanisms through which legal origins may influence a country’s level of economic 
globalization, specifically their enforcement of property rights and contracts, shareholder rights, 
creditors rights, and bank development. The authors then introduce the Legal Origins Theory, 
which reaffirms how legal origin continues to influence institutions and policymaking towards 
economic freedom. Additionally, the research challenges the argument that legal origin is 
inconsequential to the process of a country’s financial development. The authors cite several 
studies to reinforce the significance of the three categories through which they evaluate the 
impacts of legal origin. The comprehensive nature of this study, while beneficial for covering a 
breadth of categories related to legal origin, is also one of its possible weaknesses. The authors 
admit that they excluded many of the control variables used in their previous studies for the sake 
of simplicity. The purpose of the paper was to summarize the authors’ various findings from 
their papers published prior to this one and to clear up some controversy surrounding them in the 
years following their publishing.  
 Other research by Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2002) also discusses the 
enforcement of property rights but takes a more focused approach on how legal origins influence 
financial markets. They introduce other researchers who have made this connection before, 
 8 
including themselves, but aim to specify the specific channels through which legal origin matters 
for financial development. According to legal theory, there are two channels that do this: the 
political channel and the adaptability channel. The political channel states that “(a) legal 
traditions differ in terms of the priority they attach to private property rights versus the rights of 
the State and (b) the protection of private contracting rights forms the basis of financial 
development” (2). English common law favored private property rights against the crown 
whereas French and German civil codes placed power in the state. The adaptability channel 
states that “(a) legal traditions differ in their ability to evolve with changing conditions and (b) 
legal traditions that adapt efficiently to minimize the gap between the contracting needs of the 
economy and the legal system’s capabilities will more effectively foster financial development 
than more rigid systems” (2,3). In summary, the implications of these channels are that legal 
systems that place greater emphasis on the role of the state, such as France, build institutions that 
reflect this and ultimately hinder financial development. Countries with common law origins 
have judicial systems that are more likely to respond to changing conditions efficiently due to a 
greater exercise of jurisprudence instead of reliance on statutory law.  
 Two major conclusions from this literature will play a role in my theory development 
later in this paper. The first is that “the Civil law tradition tends to centralize and intensify state 
power and therefore takes a more wary stance toward the development of free financial systems 
than the common law.” The second is that ‘the adaptability channel stresses that Common law 
countries have notably more adaptable legal traditions than French civil law countries” (Beck et 
al., 2002). Because the ability to promote free financial development is a component in economic 
globalization, this research will be crucial in theorizing the methods through which legal origin 
impacts economic globalization. Some drawbacks to this research are that empirical indicators of 
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state control of the judiciary and legal adaptability are imperfect and therefore make it difficult to 
distinguish between the two mechanisms. The authors clarify that these two mechanisms are 
interrelated in law and finance theory, but they present two different channels of ways that legal 
origin influences financial development. This research was also published in 2002 prior to the 
2008 global financial crisis, which may have resulted in different conclusions from the authors 
regarding financial development. As my model will also be, this is a cross-country time-series 
regression that can be considered broad, but in order to account for multiple legal origins across 
a variety of countries, this is necessary.  
3. Modern Implications of Legal Origin and Economic Development 
 A chapter in The Blackwell Companion to Law in Society (Ed. Sarat 2004) titled 
“Economic Globalisation and the Law in the Twenty-First Century” written by Francis Snyder 
speculates how changing forces in the international sphere have triggered a transformation of 
both international and domestic legal systems. The specific forces Snyder mentions are the 
“growth of multinational corporations and international production networks, new technology, 
changes in the nature of form and work, and the rise of new actors on the international scene” 
(624). Snyder explains that domestic legal fields have had to become more internationalized as a 
result of these changing forces within the international field. There are two ways in which this 
transformation has occurred. The first is that “legal and political arenas that had previously been 
mainly national in terms of background assumptions, actors, and orientation were increasingly 
influenced by ‘external’ factors. Second, purportedly ‘domestic’ decisions were conditioned, 
shaped, or even actually made elsewhere as transnational legal regimes penetrated national legal 
fields.” (625). These transformations described by the author must be understood under the 
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assumption that national fields were willingly participating in the global economy and made the 
changes necessary to be able to do so.  
 The literature produced by Snyder is significant to my own research because it proposes 
major ways that national legal and political institutions may have diverged from their legal 
origins after the major rise of globalization in the post-World War II era. This may be an 
important step in rounding out a theory of how legal origin continues to have influence over 
levels of globalization. Snyder also makes the point that certain countries have been better at 
making the necessary transformations to their legal systems for mass globalization than others. It 
should be noted that the conclusions in this chapter are not of Snyder’s own empirical research 
but draw from previous research by multiple other scholars to pose questions about and make 
suggestions for the future of global governance. Since the connections made in this chapter are 
not answering a specific research question, they are merely speculative and prompt further 
research along with policy changes. However, this does not discredit the work of the researchers 
from whom Snyder references the basis of his ideas. I will draw from the connections Snyder 
made in this chapter to inform the connections that I will make in the development of my own 
theory.  
 The final piece of literature included in this sub-section is “National Judges and Courts as 
Institutions for Global Economic Governance” by Camilla Capucio (2015). This article is a call 
to action for state institutions to reenvision themselves as instruments beyond their current role 
as structures for global governance. State institutions, such as judges and courts, are no longer 
limited to their role within sovereign states but are now faced with solving global problems that 
their governments are faced with today. Capucio’s article claims that international forces have 
had a profound impact on states, who now need to restructure themselves to accommodate 
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international law. The author writes that “the new sovereignty is related to the ability to 
participate in joint efforts, and to be in connection to the rest of the world …. Opening space for 
the performance of its institutions as architectures of global governance and reaffirming (this 
new type) of sovereignty” (359). This quote seems to be hinting at power structures within the 
global government, possibly implying that states that are able to restructure their domestic 
institutions to be major influencers of global governance will benefit the most from the 
international political economy. This article also seems to echo the adaptability channel 
mentioned previously by Beck et al. (2002), emphasizing the importance of dynamic legal 
institutions. Not only do domestic courts have the responsibility of enforcing national and 
international laws, but they also help create the laws which move through the system of 
multilevel global governance. International laws often originate in domestic courts and are 
implemented by international organizations at the global and regional levels.  
 The purpose of Capucio’s paper is not to bring new research into the field but to draw 
from the research of other scholars to provide a supporting argument for an enhanced role of 
domestic courts in global economic governance. Much like Snyder’s article, there is no new 
empirical data included in their work for us to unpack, but it presents arguments that are worth 
taking into consideration in my own theory. The recommendations proposed by Capucio are 
based on research from other scholars in the fields of economics and political science. Similar to 
Snyder and Capucio’s work referenced in this section, I will use both the empirical research and 
theoretical writing of other scholars to help build my theory of the connection between legal 
origin and economic globalization.  
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4. Opposition to Legal Origin Theory 
Not all research supports that legal origin remains relevant to today’s world. An article by 
Cabrelli and Siems (2015) argues that legal origin theory loses traction in current applications of 
corporate law. Specifically, it suggests that the theory “fails to consider the political determinants 
of corporate law and corporate governance systems” (122).  Cabrelli and Siems also suggest that 
“historical linkages between countries may have become weaker as a consequence of the 
convergence of legal and economic systems” (122). The research in this paper calls into question 
the relevance of legal origin in today’s corporate law. These statements, however, are merely 
suggestions. When researching a concept such as legal origin, speculation and interpretation are 
major parts of that work. Scholars can spend equal amounts of time speculating the relevance of 
legal origins as they will the irrelevance of it. This article proposes that there is still lots of room 
for research to be conducted on legal origin at both the national and global levels.  
 
Section III. Theory 
 Working from the assumptions made in the literature section, I will develop a theory on 
how legal origin impacts levels of economic globalization, eventually informing my hypothesis. 
The beginning of my theory focuses on how English common law and French commercial (or 
civil) law differed in their origins and eventually in their development over the past few 
centuries. For the purpose of conciseness, I will only be basing my assumptions on the origins 
and divergences of the two legal systems beginning in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  I 
will then move into how these structural differences impact the efficiency of judicial systems and 
institutions and how that, in turn, may result in varying levels of economic globalization.  
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 The beginning of this theory starts with the fundamental differences between English 
common law and French civil law, as described by Glaeser and Shleifer (2002). The English 
legal system was developed with the intent of reducing the control of the sovereign and favoring 
private land and business owners. This was achieved by giving power to independent juries and 
judges. The legal system which came about is referred to as case law. This legal system places 
emphasis on judicial opinion and interpretation of the constitution. In contrast, French 
commercial law was formed under circumstances which placed judges under royal control. 
During the Napoleonic era, the legal system evolved to work through codified statutes. This 
means that judges adhere to these codes, which serve as “umbrellas” of other laws that are not 
necessarily written down. This leaves less room for judicial interpretation of laws if the law in 
question already adheres to a statute or code. These two different legal processes result in what 
La Porta et al. (2008) determines to be “different styles of social control of businesses and 
institutions.” Legal systems are responsible, in part, for creating and enforcing the environment 
of laws that the private sector (mostly in democratic countries) is able to operate within.  
 If we consider these statements from La Porta et al. (2008), along with the channels that 
are described by Beck et al. (2002), we can interpret how those channels promote financial 
development under English common law and French commercial law. We can also infer how 
these channels may promote economic growth in a larger sense since financial institutions are a 
major part of the greater national economy as a whole. As a refresher, the two channels Beck et 
al. introduce are the “political” and “adaptability” channels. The first of the two takeaways from 
these channels is that the political channel stresses that the civil law tradition promotes the 
development of institutions that promote state power and ultimately have adverse effects on 
financial development. The second takeaway is that common law evolves more efficiently 
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compared to civil law because judges are able to respond on a case-by-case basis to changing 
traditions. Inefficient laws, or laws that hinder financial development, are replaced with more 
efficient laws when they are brought to the courts and go through repeated litigation.  
Countries with common law origins produce legal institutions that more heavily favor 
private property rights and open financial development, while they also have a system that can 
more efficiently address laws that produce market failures. From the information outlined in this 
paper, I derive a key assumption: the case law (jurisprudence) structure and free-market 
orientation of English common law legal origin countries allow judicial systems to be more 
dynamic and respond to changing conditions more efficiently, whereas the statutes systems of 
French commercial law countries are more rigid due to their close attachment to the state, 
ultimately making them less dynamic.  
These foundational qualities of legal origin would continue to apply even after several 
large waves of globalization occurred in the post-World War II era. Globalization introduced 
new actors and regulatory bodies such as international organizations, multinational corporations, 
large alliances, and trade agreements. What came from this was unforeseen and frequently 
changing circumstances for national legal institutions. Again, two assumptions in this theory will 
be derived from the previous literature of Camilla Capucio (2015). The first assumption is that 
standards and rules of international law require the institutions of states to reform in order to 
meet those standards and ultimately be able to participate in the global economy. The second 
assumption is that the success of states in the global economy is based on their ability to 
efficiently reform their institutions so that they can achieve a comparative advantage and 
possibly even influence the global political economy.  
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The more adaptable a legal origin system is, then the more efficiently they should be able 
to respond to changing conditions in the global economy. Due to their emphasis on jurisprudence 
and adaptive superiority, countries with English common law legal origin should be able to 
create institutions that can respond to international conditions more efficiently than countries 
with French commercial law origin. Some institutions which promote economic growth that La 
Porta et al. (2008) identify as producing better outcomes in common law countries compared to 
commercial law countries are investment protection and financial development, less government 
regulation of markets, and independent judicial systems.  
I develop the theory further by anticipating that because the two biggest founders of both 
the Liberal International Economic Order and the Bretton Woods System, the United States and 
England, have common law legal origins, those international institutions developed since their 
founding will favor countries with the same legal origins. Based on the theory developed in this 
section, the hypothesis that I will be testing is as follows: 
 
Countries with English common law legal origins are more likely to experience higher  
levels of economic globalization than countries with alternative legal origins.  
 
 There are a few other assumptions that I make in this theory. The first is that despite the 
inevitable evolution of legal systems in individual states over time, legal origins have persisted 
as the foundation of institutions that promote economic and financial development. The second 
assumption is that free financial development is a crucial component of economic development 
and globalization. The final assumption is that countries in which legal origin has been 
transplanted have not significantly diverged from their legal origins and that the negative 
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externalities sometimes associated with the transplantation of legal origin do not affect the 
institutions which support economic development.  
 Due to their independent judicial systems, emphasis on private property rights, and 
adaptive orientation, I expect that states with common law origins will have higher levels of 
economic globalization compared to states with alternative legal origins. This expectation is 
made under the condition that all states are willing and able, to the best of their ability, to 
participate competitively in the global economy.   
 
Section IV. Testing the Hypothesis and Methodology 
In order to test my hypothesis, I will be using data from the Quality of Government Basic 
Dataset (Dahlberg, et al. 2019). The dataset is comprised of cross-national and time-series 
variables. For the Basic Time-Series dataset, the years included for the data are from 1946 to 
2018 for 211 countries. Not all countries have data for each year within the time frame, but none 
are excluded from the research. The creators of the dataset used United Nations membership as 
the determining factor of inclusion for countries. They also included an additional seventeen 
“historical” countries that may not exist anymore for the purpose of having a more accurate time-
series dataset. Using a dataset beginning in 1946 allows us to see to take a close look at the 
extensive data accumulated in the post-World War II era. This time period underwent several 
significant changes, including the creation of the Bretton Woods system, the rise of major 
international institutions, and several changes in global power structures. These changes have 
been the topic of extensive research. Given that I will be using the cross-section time-series 
dataset, the unit of analysis in my research will be country-year.   
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1. Central Explanatory Variable and Dependent Variable 
 The central explanatory variable used to test the hypothesis will be legal origin, 
identified as lp_legor in the dataset (La Porta et al. 1999).  This variable identifies the legal 
origin of the company law or commercial code of 157 countries worldwide. Data for this variable 
is available from 1946 to 2018. Legal structures were spread across the world through 
colonization and other involuntary methods or through voluntary adoption. It has five different 
possible origins, which are scored in order: English Commercial law, French Commercial Code, 
Socialist/ Communist Laws, German Commercial Code, and Scandinavian Code. Since I will be 
comparing common law with all other legal origins, English Common Law origin will be coded 
as one, and the remaining origins will be rescored and coded as zero.   
The dependent variable in the study is economic globalization, identified as dr_eg. I will 
be referring to it as globalization in the data. This measurement, in its most recent update, comes 
from the KOF Globalisation Index (Gygli et al. 2019), which was originally introduced by Axel 
Dreher in 2006. It measures the levels of trade flows and financial flows in 185 countries with 
the data covering the time period from 1970 to 2015. The levels of economic globalization are on 
a scale of one to one hundred, with higher values indicating a higher level of globalization for 
that country. The level of measurement for economic globalization is continuous. A distinction is 
made between de facto trade and de jure trade in the index. De facto trade is “determined with 
reference to the trade in goods and services, and de jure trade covers customs, duties, taxes, and 
restrictions on trade” (Dahlberg et al. 2019).  
2. Control Variables 
My first control variable is regime durability, which measures the number of years since 
the most recent regime change or the beginning of a transition period in a country. The first year 
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of a new regime change is coded as the baseline year, giving it a value of zero. Each following 
year without a regime change adds to the value consecutively until a new regime change or 
transition period begins. In the dataset, this variable is denoted as p_durable, and I will continue 
referring to it as regime durability. There is data available for 182 countries from the years 1946 
to 2017. A regime change can possibly impact economic globalization by redirecting trade flows 
with other countries or by increasing or lowering trade barriers. A new regime or transition 
period can have possible positive or negative impacts on trade by making goods and services 
easier or more difficult to access. Trade and financial institutions that have existed for and 
developed over a long period of time, which exist mainly in advanced economies, may be more 
embedded in the global economy and create a stronger relationship between that country and 
economic globalization (Husain et al. 2005). Younger regimes with less-developed institutions 
may not have a strong relationship with economic globalization, and this difference needs to be 
controlled for.  
My second control variable is regime type, specifically whether or not a country is a 
democracy. This variable categorizes countries that are considered a democracy if they have a 
parliamentary, semi-presidential (mixed), or presidential political regime. The specific 
qualifications determined by the creators (Cheibub et al., 2010) is if the “executive and the 
legislature is directly or indirectly elected by popular vote, multiple parties are allowed, there is a 
de facto existence of multiple parties outside of regime front, there are multiple parties within the 
legislature, and there has been no consolidation of incumbent advantage (QOG Dataset 2019). 
There are two codes available: 0 if a country is not a democracy, and 1 if it is a democracy. 
Regime type is coded as chga_demo in the QOG dataset, and I will refer to it as ‘Democracy.’ 
There are 206 countries included in this variable from the years 1946 to 2008. Democratic 
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regimes are more likely to participate in the Liberal International Economic Order and be open to 
trade with other democracies (Eichengreen 2008). This can have a significant impact on 
globalization, so it needs to be controlled.  
The third control variable in my regression is the total country population. This variable 
is denoted as wdi_pop in the QOG dataset but, I will refer to it as ‘population.’ The total 
population variable includes all residents of a country regardless of their legal status or 
citizenship (World Bank 2016). There is data available in this variable for 199 countries from the 
years 1960 to 2017. There is a correlation between labor force growth and capital deepening 
found by La Croix et al. 2002, which implies that countries with lower rates of labor force 
growth have higher rates of capital growth. Large economies in developed countries are the most 
likely to have deep integration in the global economy because of their ability to focus on 
financial growth and high-skilled labor markets.  
The fourth and final control variable in my model is gross domestic product per capita 
based on purchasing parity power in constant 2011 international dollars. This variable, created 
by the World Bank in 2016, converts GDP per capita to international dollars using purchasing 
parity power rates. What this means is that the international dollar has the same purchasing 
power as the US dollar within the United States. It is calculated by taking the “gross value added 
by all resident producers in addition to any product taxes minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products” (QOG dataset 2019). This variable includes the years from 1990 to 2017 
and has data available for 189 countries. It is denoted as wdi_gdpcappppcon2011 in the dataset, 
but I will be referring to it just as ‘GDP per capita.’ GDP has a close relationship with economic 
globalization, leading to high economic growth and convergence across world regions 
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(Leimbach et al. 2017). Thus, I control for any impact GDP per capita may have on economic 
globalization.  
 
3. Methodology 
Since my dependent variable, economic globalization, is continuous, I will be using an OLS 
regression model to test my hypothesis. I will accept my hypothesis if the central explanatory 
variable, legal origin, has a positive coefficient that is statistically significant. The legal origin 
we are testing is English common law, which has been coded as 1, and all other categories of 
legal origin have been rescored and given a value of 0. The regression equation which estimates 
the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables is as follows: 
𝑦 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑥1 + 𝑏2𝑥2 + 𝑏3𝑥3 + 𝑏4𝑥4 + 𝑏5𝑥5 
In this equation, 𝑥1is the value of legal origin, 𝑥2 is the value of regime durability, 𝑥3 is the 
measure of democracy status, 𝑥4 is the total population value, and 𝑥5 is the value of GDP per 
capita.  
 
Section V. Analysis of Results 
 After running my OLS regression model, I identified some significant correlations. The 
relationship between my central explanatory variable, English common law, and my dependent 
variable resulted in a coefficient of 1.762. This relationship is statistically significant at a 99% 
confidence level. These findings support the prediction in my hypothesis that an English 
common law legal origin has a positive relationship with economic globalization.  
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 The second correlation I found was between my first control variable, regime durability, 
and economic globalization. This correlation was also statistically significant at a 99% 
confidence level; however, the positive coefficient was only 0.082. This relationship can be 
interpreted as, for every consecutive year of continuous regime durability, there will be a 0.082 
increase in the index of economic globalization for that country. While this relationship is 
positive and statistically significant, regime durability does not have a major impact on the level 
of economic globalization for a country.  
 The extent to which population size impacted economic globalization took me by 
surprise. It had a coefficient of -2.06e-08 at a 99% confidence level. As predicted by La Croix et 
al. (2002), population size had adverse effects on globalization. This means that significant 
increases in population size have a negative impact on the index of economic globalization. This 
connection may be more complex than what is presented in this simple regression model because 
the value of standard error is also quite small. It is possible that population and globalization 
both influence each other in significant ways, a topic which is further explored by La Croix et al. 
2002 but may be researched to a much further extent.  
 The next control variable in the regression was regime type (democracy). This correlation 
was positive, with a coefficient of 4.07 and is statistically significant with a confidence level of 
Table 1: Effects of Legal Origin on Globalization, 1946-2018 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Legal Origin 1.762*** (0.512) 
Regime Durability 0.082*** (0.009) 
Population -2.06e-08*** (1.65e-09) 
Democracy 4.037*** (0.488) 
GDP Per Capita 0.001*** (0.000) 
Constant 40.343*** (0.429) 
N = 2,401 
R-Squared = 0.5204 
Statistical Significance levels: *signifies p≤0.05, **signifies p≤0.01, ***signifies p≤0.001 
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99%. Such a large coefficient suggests that the positive impact being a democracy has on a 
country’s level of economic globalization is very strong. The field of international relations has 
no shortage of research articles and books that examine the relationship between democracy and 
globalization. Because the liberal international economic order was formed by countries with 
democratic governments, it is unsurprising that democratic countries participate the most in the 
global economy and experience higher levels of economic globalization because of this.  
 My final control variable was gross domestic product converted to constant 2011 
international dollar values using purchasing parity power rates. Its relationship with economic 
globalization was also seemingly minuscule, with a positive coefficient of only 0.001. It was a 
statistically significant relationship with a confidence level of 99%. This result makes me 
question if a measurement of just GDP per capita without calculations of purchasing parity 
power would have had a greater impact on economic globalization. This result does not indicate 
that the correlation proposed by Leimbach et al. (2017) is very strong.  
 An additional note for this section is that the R-Squared value of the model was 0.5204. 
This means that 52.04% of the contributory factors which contribute to economic globalization 
are attributed to the four independent variables I tested. This also indicates that there are several 
other factors that contribute to the economic globalization index. 
 
Section VI. Discussion of Findings and Conclusion 
 The results I found from running the OLS regression model found evidence that 
supported by hypothesis. With a positive and statistically significant coefficient, I can conclude 
that countries with English common law legal origin have higher levels of economic 
globalization compared to countries with other legal origins. These findings may align with my 
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theory that common law legal systems are more dynamic than other legal origins like 
commercial law or communist and socialist systems (Beck et al. 2002). Common law origin 
countries may have responded more efficiently to the massive globalization waves of the post-
World War II period by creating superior institutions to capitalize on that advantage.  
 As reflected by my R-Squared value, there are far more contributing factors of economic 
globalization that went unaccounted for in my regression model. Additionally, the control 
variable of the total population that I used may be difficult to draw decisive conclusions from 
because there are arguments that support that population and globalization both influence each 
other. Another possible weakness in my regression was using the GDP per capita converted into 
constant 2011 international dollars using purchasing parity power. The coefficient it produced 
was very small and did not indicate a large influence on economic globalization. This could be 
due to the fact that it had the shortest time period of available data out of all the variables. Using 
a different measure of global capital levels may have yielded significantly different results. I was 
also unable to produce a breakdown of the relationship proposed by my hypothesis by country in 
detail. The nature of this study is very broad, and there is lots of room for further research to 
examine the relationship between legal origin and economic globalization in greater detail. For 
example, the central explanatory carriable was rescored to only focus on English common law 
and grouped together with the remaining four legal origins. My research design was created with 
the theory in mind that the common law origin favors the creation of institutions that are more 
likely to promote more efficient participation in the global political economy. Future research 
may find a way to empirically prove or disprove this theory that common law has the greatest 
positive relationship with economic globalization.  
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 The purpose of this paper was to explore whether the common legal origins of a country 
could positively impact something as broad as economic globalization today, despite centuries of 
development and changes being made to modern legal systems. This paper provided evidence 
that the structural components of a country; in this case, it’s legal system, may still influence the 
institutions it operates through. Researchers have provided evidence for connections regarding 
legal origin that similar to this one before, and this paper builds upon that work to try to make a 
connection to economic globalization. The evidence obtained from my regression model may not 
influence future policy decisions of state officials but can possibly explain the decision-making 
process of states at the institutional level. This research is both supported and undermined by 
theories produced by other researchers and is speculative in nature, so the evidence provided 
here may require further investigation.  
Future research regarding legal origins and economic globalization may want to make a 
comparison between countries that voluntarily adopted their legal system from another country 
and those countries in which the legal origin was involuntarily implanted. A more detailed study 
that looks at individual countries may find that the same legal origin in one country does not 
have as much of an impact on economic globalization as it does in another. This type of study 
could also provide better insight into how economic globalization is impacted by legal origin in 
developing countries versus developed ones.  
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Appendix: 
 
 
Stata Output for Table 1: 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observation Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Economic 
Globalization 
2,401 51.72735 16.59831 15.25539 93.58852 
Legal Origin 2,401 .3290296 .4699586 0 1 
Regime 
Durability 
2,401 26.10537 32.10033 0 199 
Population 2,401 4.29e+07 1.46e+08 311840 1.32e+09 
GDP Per 
Capita 
2,401 14484.31 18534.85 247.4365 119723.1 
Democracy 2,401 .5556018 .4970023 0 1 
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Stata Output for Table 2: 
 
 
Operationalization of Variables  
Dependent Variables 
Variable  Operationalization Source 
Economic Globalization 
(dr_eg) 
Scale of 1 to 100 ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss 
Economic Institute. Dreher, 
Axel (2006). (Gygli et al. 
2019)  
 
Central Explanatory Variable  
Variable  Operationalization Source  
Legal Origin (lp_legor) 1. English Common Law 
2. French Commercial 
Code 
3. Socialist/Communist 
Laws 
4. German Commercial 
Code 
5. Scandinavian 
Commercial Code  
La Porta et al., 1999 
 
Control Variables  
Variable  Operationalization Source 
Regime Durability 
(p_durable) 
“Year Zero” (value = 0), 
subsequent values for each 
year since last regime change 
Marshall and Jaggers 2018 
Regime Type (chga_demo) 0 = No Democracy 
1 = Democracy 
Cheibub et al., 2010 
Total Population (wdi_pop) De facto total population World Bank, 2016 
GDP Per Capita, Purchasing 
Power Parity, constant 2011 
dollar 
(wdi_gdpcappppcon2011) 
GDP per capita converted 
into international dollars 
using purchasing power 
parity rates  
World Bank, 2016 
 
